Defense planning for the late 1990s

How does the United States fashion a defense policy for a world in which it has strong and reliable allies, no major enemies, and the best military in history - and yet at the same time has a host of worries about its future security and a strong sense that the world is anything but safe? At a time when all of government is being asked to become more efficient, Michael O'Hanlon shows how the United States could prudently cut defense spending by as much as 10 percent without risking its ability to respond to simultaneous regional crises or maintain global commitments. O'Hanlon summarizes the military doctrine and budgetary dimensions of the Clinton administration's "bottom-up review" plan for U.S. defense forces. He argues that U.S. strategists have not yet adjusted defense planning to the post-Soviet world and are focusing excessively, if somewhat understandably, on the vestiges of the cold war in places such as the Korean peninsula. He calls for Western support of more innovative approaches to UN peace operations and a reorientation of the NATO alliance away from concern with Russia and toward other combat scenarios.